In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Commentary on ThucydidesMortimer ChambersSimon Hornblower. A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume II, Books IV-V.24. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. xvi + 520 pp. Cloth, $125.On the morrow of finishing the commentary on Thucydides of Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, the Clarendon Press asked Hornblower for a short companion, on the model of How and Wells on Herodotus. But even as Gomme's projected three volumes grew to five, Hornblower's two (...) volumes will eventually swell to three. The present commentary, essentially on book 4, is more than one hundred pages longer than Gomme. There is but one map (Amphipolis); one of Pylos would have been welcome.Volume I (1991) lacked an introduction. Hornblower now supplies one, about as long as his Thucydides (London 1987) and, like that book, comprising separate parts. (Note "finally, I shall talk about...," 70, and "in this part of my paper...," 83—apparently deriving from his Oxford classes in 1995.) He opens with a respectful nineteen-page review of Gomme, including possible improvements on the master. One such improvement is in translating every single lemma, including even all proper names. And Hornblower does much more with narratology, which to him (see OCD3 1521) is nothing more threatening than attention to the design and structure of a narrative. Those who deplore literary jargon have little to fear: the term "focalizer" often appears, but the language is not excessively trendy.Hornblower then considers the article by R. S. Stroud, "Thucydides and Corinth," Chiron 24 (1994) 267-304. Both the present volume and Stroud's paper are important for our understanding of Thucydides' career; unfortunately, it appears that both scholars at times misunderstand each other. Stroud shows that the historian had "excellent detailed knowledge of Corinthian affairs" (as Horn-blower, 21, agrees) and suggests that he got this knowledge in the course of a residence in the city. Stroud nowhere says that Thucydides stayed there all twenty years, and Hornblower, for some reason eager to demolish this nonsug-gestion, edgily allows him only visits to Corinth (22).Then comes the pleasant tale (Marcellinus Vit. Thuc. 25) that Thucydides retired to Thrace in his exile and there wrote his work beneath a plane tree. In 1987 Hornblower (Thucydides 3) suggested that the historian "remained at least based in Thrace"—but did not (as Stroud comes close to implying) say he spent twenty years there, much less that he wrote beneath a plane tree—and pointed to some Greeks who traveled in northern Greece and might have given him information. This is possible, but it does rather undervalue Thucydides' statement (5.26.5) that he spent most of his time (, Thucydidean litotes for "above all") with Peloponnesians.Another misunderstanding then comes when Hornblower criticizes Stroud for the a priori assertion—one not made by Stroud, as far as I can see— that "because ancient historians spent 'most of their time' looking at places and talking to people other than historians, it follows that they never read or heard [End Page 465] or were influenced by or tried to correct each other or earlier literary figures" (25). If I have quoted his words exactly, it is because this accusation against Stroud need not have been made. Hornblower then shows clearly that Thu-cydides read Herodotus, who published (let us leave the meaning of the word open) before him. But in doing so he is unnecessarily severe on a young scholar who has not yet presented his work in final form: much of this criticism could have been postponed until such a time.So there is plenty of lively argument in this section, but it will date quickly: such controversy belongs in a journal somewhere, not in a commentary that will last many years. As Wade-Gery said in his review of Gomme's first volume (JHS 69 [1949] 84), an editor is no longer a member of the Opposition, he holds a portfolio and sits on the other side of the House.Next, Hornblower gives us an interesting section on the portrait of Brasidas (4.11-5.11), arguing that Thucydides wanted to write an of Brasidas on a Homeric model (wounds, success, confrontation with his main... (shrink)

Human need and related concepts such as basic needs have long been part of the implicit conceptual foundation for social work theory, practice, and research. However, while the published literature in social work has long stressed social justice, and has incorporated discussion of human rights, human need has long been both a neglected and contested concept. In recent years, the explicit use of human needs theory has begun to have a significant influence on the literature in social work.

This paper explores a distinctive form of social interaction—interpersonal inquiry—in which two or more people attempt to understand one another by engaging in conversation. Like many modes of inquiry into human beings, interpersonal inquiry partly shapes its own objects. How we conduct it thus affects who we become. I present an ethical ideal of conversation to which, I argue, at least some of our interpersonal inquiry ought to aspire. I then consider how this ideal might influence philosophical conceptions of the (...) self. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Locke on the Knowledge of Material Things ROBERT FENDEL ANDERSON IT IS nOT John Locke's intention, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to deal with matter and material substance nor with how these are able to affect the mind. These are considerations for natural philosophy; Locke counts himself rather among the moral philosophers. He does not propose, therefore, to meddle with the physical aspects of the mind, nor with (...) the physical production of sensations through the organs, nor with the production of ideas in the understanding, nor even with whether ideas depend upon matter for their source. He defers to the wisdom of such men as Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens and Newton in these considerations, and finds it "... ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge....,, 1 It is true that Locke's Essay is characterized chiefly not by an interest in matter and the mechanics of perception but rather by an interest in epistemology and in the ordering and assessment of our knowledge. Because of the very nature and emphasis of this epistemology, however, Locke finds that he must, from time to time, at least mention the nature of matter and how it affects us. Finally, it becomes apparent, certain changes or ambiguities in his point of view regarding the mode of our knowledge and its certainty are consequences of his understanding of matter. It is a demonstration of these elements of his doctrine, which seem not to have obtained the full attention of such scholars as Aaron, Fraser, and Gibson, that I shall attempt in this paper. Fundamentally, Locke's theory of matter appears to be that of Democritus and Epicurus. Like the Greek atomists, he conceives of matter as consisting of particles or corpuscles infinite in number. At least some of these are so minute as to be individually insensible, and probably he intends that all are, although, to my knowledge, he never states that this is so. In the aggregate, in any case, particles do constitute perceptible bodies. As for the Greeks, so also for Locke, the particles arc all extended, having size and shape. They are said also to possess motion or rest, although he takes care to say that matter cannot produce motion in itself,e Locke frequently mentions other properties as being "primary" or "really in" material things. Some of these are solidity, texture, cohesion of parts, situation, and number. Apparently some of these may be ranked under others since, as he 1"Epistle to the Reader," Vol. I, p. 14. All footnotes refer to passages in John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, collated and annotated, with prolegomena, biographical, critical, and historical by Alexander Campbell Fraser, in two volumes (New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). Large Roman numerals refer to books of the Essay; small Roman numerals refer to chapters of the books; Arabic numerals refer to sections of the chapters. 2 IV, x, 10. [205] 206 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY remarks, figure presupposes extension, and receiving or communicating motion through impact presupposes solidity. The influences of these particles upon one another are treated by Locke under the topic of "powers," a notion which includes in it some kind of "secret relation of parts." 3 The capacities in any substance to give alterations of primary qualities are active powers; the capacities to receive such alterations are passive powers. This alteration must be accomplished by impact or impulse since this, Locke says, is the only way in which bodies can be conceived to operate. Sensation in the percipient being then is to be understood as a special case of this impact of particles upon others. It is evident to Locke that from external obiects some motion must be conveyed by some parts of our bodies to the brain or seat of sensation to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of these external objects. We are able by sight to perceive at a distance the primary qualities of bodies of observable size. Locke reasons that therefore "... some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sanford Freedman CHARACTER IN A COHERENT FICTION: ON PUTTING KING LEAR BACK TOGETHER AGAIN Criticism has never been able to talk about fictionality very long without talking about an "inside" and an "outside," a fictional world's relation to a non-fictional world. And always there lies an immediate tension in this relation posed by the concept of coherence. That is, does a fictional world cohere because it corresponds to meanings (...) "outside" die text or does a fictional world cohere because its "inside" parts stand in meaningful relation to each other? Northrop Frye, in explicating his dieory of symbols, distinguishes between "inside" and "outside" critical directions: Whenever we read anything, we find our attention moving in two directions at once. One direction is outward or centrifugal, in which we keep going outside our reading, from the individual words to the things they mean, or, in practice, to our memory of the conventional association between them. The other direction is inward or centripetal, in which we try to develop from the words a sense of the larger verbal pattern they make.1 That Frye suggests that critics see in both directions at once separates him from most twentieth-century Shakespearean critics who exaggerate one direction at the expense of the other. In this essay I will examine criticism of King Lear, specifically criticism about the play's characters from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, as a way of assessing this distinction, focusing on two related problems: first, how the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' legacy of"inside"/"outside" talk affects twentieth-century critical debate, and second, how twentieth-century controversy polarizes "insides" and "outsides" without acknowledging the implications of doing so. If such an exaimination serves to undermine dominant twentieth-century concepts of coherence within Shakespearean criticism by pointing to unwritten rules-of-thumb, it does so, ultimately, to alter perspective on the supposed rites of passage from theories which give us cleair, alternative versions of a fictional world (traditional theories) to theories which seem to leave us floundering in a pluralist acceptance of all possible versions of a fictional world (deconstructive theories). 196 Sanford Freedman197 Eighteenth-century critics do not scrutinize King Lear from the point of view of character but rather through the mental images or ideas which the characters' words evoke. When Johnson faults Shakespeare's description of Dover Cliff in IV.vi, he argues diat the passage "does not impress die mind at once with the horrible idea of an immense height. The impression is divided; you pass on, by computation, from one stage of the tremendous space to another."2 Lifting Edgar's words out of die context of character, Johnson assumes the role of the purveyor of literature, akin to the role Pope assumed when he starred the "beauties" in his Shakespearean texts. What concernsJohnson is the "true" effect of looking down from a precipice, and he implies that the description should produce in different minds the same idea, an idea which is for him a singular idea, unmediated by composite ideas because the idea of looking down from a precipice necessitates that the immediacy of effect be synonymous with that of the idea. Edgar's purpose in leading his father to the cliffis overshadowed by the idea of looking down from a cliff, and we would do well to investigate an "outside" source, Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, rather than the Shakespearean text, as a means of discovering the purposefulness of Johnson's comment. Critical significance lies notjust inJohnson's airing ofneoclassical concern, but, more importantly, in his failure to find what he expects to be "there" in the play's "inside." Ideas, not characters, matter to the eighteenth-century's coherence, and the scope or comprehensiveness of that coherence has relatively local application; that is, editors range over several lines looking for relevant ideas but not between scenes or acts. In fact, one explanation of why they do not see a double plot is that their critical attention, like that of Swift's Lilliputians, lacks scope; dierefore, they fail to anticipate, to see patterns. Again, Johnson, for example, does not observe Gloucester's, Edgar's, and the fool's repetition of... (shrink)

So far we have considered what it means for something to be conscious. In this section we place these considerations in a larger framework, exploring the uses of consciousness. Thus we move away from a consideration of separate conscious events îï to a concern with conscious îaccessï, îproblem-solvingï and îcontrolï. Chapter 6 describes the commonly observed "triad" of conscious problem assignment, unconscious computation of routine problems, and conscious display of solutions and subgoals. This triadic pattern is observable in many psychological (...) tasks, including creative processes, mental arithmetic, language comprehension, recall, and voluntary control. It suggests that conscious contents often serve to assign problems to unconscious processors which work out routine details, constrained by a goal context. The interplay between conscious contents and goal contexts also provides a plausible account of the stream of consciousness. In Chapter 7, a contrastive analysis of voluntary versus involuntary actions leads to a modern version of James' ideomotor theory, suggesting that voluntary actions are also recruited by conscious goal images. This view fits smoothly into our developing theory. (shrink)

In Part IV of Book I of Hume’s Treatise Hume frequently appeals to an identity ascribing mechanism of the imagination. A psychological mechanism of which it is a special case, to ‘compleat the union’, is also prominent. These mechanisms belong to the imagination narrowly conceived according to a distinction in section ix of Part III. The role and significance of these mechanisms in the development of Hume’s scepticism is explored. Appreciation of their significance is also argued to cast (...) light on Hume’s refusal to locate necessity in objects and to suggest a plausible explanation of his second thoughts about personal identity. (shrink)

La prima parte dello studio è stata pubblicata nella stessa rivista 7 39-114, cfr. MEL XVIII 3955. I temi trattati sono il luogo, il tempo e lo spazio. L'A. esamina i fondamenti dottrinali delle posizioni sostenute dai commentatori su tali questioni e nella conclusione ribadisce le principali caratteristiche esegetico-dottrinali individuate nei commenti esaminati: 1) realismo ontologico, in particolare in relazione al rapporto tempo-anima; 2) atteggiamento critico nei confronti di Averroè; 3) alcune particolarità dottrinali, come la dottrina del luogo profundans.

Guide to conditional Relations. Part 1. PTS series IV. 3. By U Narada. with 8 charts.

Este artigo procura analisar o Livro IV da Ética, mostrando como Espinosa, ao pensar as noções de liberdade e servidão humana, escapa às críticas que buscam encontrar em sua filosofia uma contradição entre a idéia de uma natureza absolutamente necessária (“fatalismo”) e sua pretensão de afirmar a liberdade do sábio.

Aristotle is without question the founder of the science of biology. In his treatise On the Parts of Animals, he develops his systematic principles for biological investigation, and explanation, and applies those principles to explain why the different animal kinds have the different parts that they do. It is one of the greatest achievements in the history of science. This new translation from the Greek aims to reflect the subtlety and detail of Aristotle's reasoning. The commentary provides help in understanding (...) each argument as well as an integrated account of the goals and methods of the work taken as a whole. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of Part IV. He responds first to James Woodward, Richard Healey, Jan Voosholz, Simon Friederich and Sach Mukherjee, before outlining his thoughts on Max Kistler’s piece.